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         ABSTRACT  
 The ICC will gain the capacity to prosecute the crime of aggression in 2017. 
The Amendments to the Rome Statute are the product of a political 
compromise and have a complex legal structure with a high definitional 
threshold for an act of aggression alongside a bespoke jurisdictional 
arrangement. This legal structure is likely to mean that very few acts of 
aggression are considered crimes. Even when acts of aggression pass the 
threshold set out in the amendments, it is highly likely that any such 
prosecution would not succeed. This paper argues that this is likely to 
significantly impact the legitimacy of the ICC as an organization. To 
understand this, it is necessary to look at the different meanings of 
legitimacy before examining how the way in which the law is configured 
could undermine the political legitimacy of the organization as a whole.  
 
 
1.       Introduction  
In 2017, the Kampala amendments to the Rome Statute will come into force, giving the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. On the face of 
it, this seems a logical step in the ICC’s development, as whilst it can currently prosecute 
crimes perpetrated during wars, it lacks the power to prosecute those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for starting conflicts. The ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction in Africa, in particular 
in Sudan, Libya, and Kenya, has caused significant controversy and whilst part of this 
hostility is the result of political double standards on the part of some states, it has had a 
wider impact on the legitimacy of the court as an institution.
1
 The ability of the court to 
prosecute the causes of the conflict could contribute to addressing these legitimacy problems, 
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and bring to justice those who are responsible for starting conflicts. Yet, there have been 
some concerns about the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute. Sean Murphy, in a 
commentary on the drafting of the Amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of 
aggression prior to their adoption at the 2010 Kampala Conference, argued there was a 
danger that a lack of clarity in the provisions could lead to the ‘compliance pull’ of the law 
being weakened.
2
 
The legitimacy of the ICC as an organization has been the subject of some considerable 
attention in recent years. Early discussions of the ICC’s legitimacy focused on institutional 
and legal questions, such as the scope of prosecutorial discretion.
3
 After the controversy 
surrounding the indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, there was a closer debate 
about the extent of the organization’s powers and its role as an international actor, with some 
of these discussions revolving around questions of bias and politicization.
4
 More recently, 
there have been attempts to examine both the philosophical grounding of the court’s legal 
framework and its ability to produce efficacious outcomes.
5
 The announcement by the 
Kenyan and South African governments that they are considering or are withdrawing from 
the ICC has triggered a wider legitimacy crisis for the court. The universalist notions the 
court sought to project have been undermined by functional problems of legitimacy, such as 
its focus on Africa and the non-cooperation by major states. This paper argues that these 
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existing problems of legitimacy will be actively worsened by ICC’s acquisition of jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression.  
This is due to the structure of the law itself which defines the new crime in a manner which 
significantly limits the types of action that may be classed as aggression and has a 
jurisdictional regime even more restrictive than the Rome Statute currently has. The Kampala 
Amendments will severely limit the number of actual instances of armed intervention the 
court is able to prosecute and it is quite possible that the ICC will not be able to bring a 
successful prosecution for the crime of aggression at all. Recent scholarship has identified a 
link between the pragmatic legitimacy of the ICC, that is its ability to relate to stakeholders 
and appear legitimate in their eyes, and its overall legitimacy as an organization.
6
 This link is 
likely to be severed as the ICC will gain jurisdiction over the crime of aggression but be 
practically unable to utilise this newly acquired power, calling the wider authority of the 
organization into question and contributing to existing concerns about the court’s lack of 
legitimacy.   
The first part of this article analyses the nature of the ICC’s legitimacy as an organization and 
how the assumption of the responsibility for the crime of aggression changes it. In this 
context, it becomes important to distinguish between the original legitimacy of an 
organization, which relates to a normative claim to legitimacy, and its functional legitimacy, 
which concerns the institutional ability produce results. With respect to the crime of 
aggression, the latter form of legitimacy is likely to affect the former, as the failure of the 
ICC to successfully prosecute acts of aggression will weaken the legitimacy of the 
organization as a whole. The reasons for this are explored in the second and third sections of 
this article, which analyses the structure of the Kampala Amendments. In section two, the 
                                                          
6
 Janine Natalya Clark, ‘International Criminal Courts and Normative Legitimacy: An Achievable Goal?’, 15 
International Criminal Law Review (2015) 763. 
definition of the crime of aggression under the Amendments is unpacked to show just how 
limited a definition of aggression they contain. Within this narrow definition, however, one 
act of aggression which could be prosecuted is illegal humanitarian intervention. Yet, as the 
third section demonstrates, due to the jurisdictional provisions of the Amendments and the 
procedural regime at the ICC, it is highly unlikely that a successful prosecution will take 
place in such circumstances.  
2.        The Legitimacy of the ICC and the Crime of Aggression  
The concept of legitimacy, David Hurd argues, is the ‘normative belief by an actor that a rule 
of institution ought to be obeyed.’7 It is important to emphasise the ‘ought’ in this statement, 
as this is not a description of an empirical condition of compliance or obedience. Rather, it is 
a description of a type of belief in a source of authority that an actor may hold.
8
 International 
institutions do not have coercive powers in the same way that domestic institutions are able to 
compel compliance. In any event, as scholars have pointed out, coercing individuals into 
obedience is distinct from the normative belief that such obedience ought to happen.
9
 In the 
international system, as Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope argue, legitimacy is best 
understood as the capacity of an institution or legal regime  ‘to generate fidelity to the rule of 
law itself’.10 This does not mean that there will be universal compliance with the law but does 
mean that there is a shared understanding that a particular institution issues decisions that are 
fair and ought to be followed. This is the broad definition of the word legitimacy adopted in 
this article.  
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However, this does not say much about how legitimacy is generated. Thomas Franck’s view 
was that legitimacy in international law is created by the perception that rules were 
constructed ‘fairly’ by a transparent system.11 This, as Brunnée and Toope point out, is a 
highly positivist conception of how legitimacy comes into being, and, they argue, that 
legitimacy is constructed by the interaction of actors in the international system.
12
 It is the 
latter view of legitimacy’s origin that is taken in this article, since this appears to be the case 
in relation to the ICC. The Rome Statute has 124 state parties making the ICC, from a 
positivist perspective, a legitimate actor, but as shown below, the ICC’s actions as a political 
agent have gradually destabilized its authority as an organization. To understand the 
legitimacy of the ICC, it is necessary firstly to unpack the different types of legitimacy, 
before looking at what changes may occur after the court assumes jurisdiction for the crime 
of aggression.   
2.1      Original and Functional Legitimacy  
It is important to distinguish between normative legitimacy, whether an institution has a right 
to rule in a moral or philosophical sense, and descriptive legitimacy, whether as a matter of 
fact it enjoys ‘a reservoir of support that makes people willing to defer’ to the institution even 
when it issues ‘unpopular decisions.’13 The institutional authority which enables an 
organization to deliver judgments that are regarded authoritative irrespective of their content, 
is sometimes called ‘content independent legitimacy’.14 Another way of framing this 
categorization is offered by Jean D’Aspermont and Eric De Barabandre, who outline a 
distinction between the ‘legitimacy of origin’ of an institution and its functional legitimacy 
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which is based on its exercise of power. D’Aspermont and De Barabandre argue that 
although consideration of the legitimacy of an international organization has ‘classically been 
based on the legitimacy of exercise’, this has been increasingly supplanted by arguments 
about the legitimacy of origin.
15
 Hitomi Takemura differentiates the normative legitimacy of 
the ICC, which concerns questions of ‘the authority of law’, from the sociological legitimacy, 
which concerns attitudes towards that authority.
16
 This suggests the existence of a 
relationship of the sort described by D’Aspermont and De Barabandre as the classic theory of 
organizational legitimacy, where the legitimacy of exercise informs the debate about the 
legitimacy of origin.
17
 
Debates about the ICC’s legitimacy have to date been focused the other way round, with the 
legitimacy of origin being seen as vital to the legitimacy of exercise. For example, the 
criticism that the ICC is imperialist because of principally targeting African defendants is 
predicated in part on the relative marginalization of states from the global South in the 
construction of the ICC.
18
 Therefore, in the case of the ICC, it seems that there is a stronger 
connection between the two forms of legitimacy. In view of the academic literature on the 
subject, this paper suggests that the jurisdiction over aggression if not accompanied by 
practical results, will undermine what can be described as the functional legitimacy (referred 
to above as legitimacy of exercise and descriptive legitimacy) of the ICC as an organization. 
This, in turn, has the potential to weaken the original legitimacy of the ICC (referred to above 
as normative or legitimacy of origin), compromising its ability to command authority which 
is essential for a tribunal. The ICC is already experiencing this process with the withdrawal of 
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South Africa and other states. In these cases, the criticism of the ICC has revolved around 
problems of functional legitimacy – Deputy South African President Cyril Ramaphosa 
described South Africa’s withdrawal as a ‘critique of the manner in which the institution has 
functioned.’19 However, this has the effect of undermining elements of the original legitimacy 
of the ICC, in particular the idea that the court is an institution that can promote universal 
justice.   
2.2        The original legitimacy of the ICC 
The debates on the ICC’s original legitimacy are best understood by acknowledging that the 
court is caught between two different conceptions of its institutional role. Firstly, there is the 
‘court of last resort argument’. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the ICC was ‘never intended to 
be a supra-national legal institution’ and that its purpose was to act as some form of juridical 
‘safety net’ which, under the terms of the Rome Statute, would complement national and 
regional jurisdictions.
20
 This interpretation holds that the ICC’s original legitimacy is largely 
based on the notion of state consent, although consenting to join an organization does not 
automatically make it legitimate.
21
 It also ignores the difficult balancing act that being a court 
of last resort entails. As Thomas Hansen notes, the ICC has often experienced tensions 
between its ‘universalist’ mission and the necessity to engage in ‘realpolitik’ to build trust as 
an organization.
22
 In general terms, consent based arguments for the legitimacy of the ICC do 
not fully account for the way that the court has evolved, nor does it address the differences 
among its various institutional bodies, such as the independent Office of the Prosecutor, 
which constitute an actor within the ICC system in its own right. 
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A second conception of the ICC’s institutional identity is that it is a supranational 
organization designed to override national jurisdictions in order to protect fundamental 
human rights and safeguard the international community. This view of the ICC is defended 
by Aaron Fichtelberg, who claims that the court possesses a ‘normative legitimacy’ which 
justifies its overriding the decisions of sovereign states.
23
 Such an understanding makes an 
appeal to the transcendent authority of human rights, and provides an alternative basis for the 
court’s legitimacy. This cosmopolitan form of argument assumes that the ICC’s institutional 
power is vested above the existing constraints of statehood in the international system, 
empowering it to enforce international law in the interests of humanity itself. Also, there is 
the notion that the ICC gains a crucial component of its legitimate authority over state parties 
because it is an institution that acts for the welfare of people at large and protects individuals 
from international crimes.
24
 Some state parties to the ICC have openly endorsed this view, 
with the German and Polish delegates at the Seventh Session of the Assembly of State 
Parties praising the court for its role in strengthening the ‘rule of law all over the world’ and 
describing international criminal justice as a cause in and of itself.
25
      
2.3        The Original Legitimacy of the Crime of Aggression  
It is also important in the context of the argument in this article to illustrate the difference 
between the legitimacy of an organization and the legitimacy of the international law that an 
organization intends to enforce. The two questions are often related and have been considered 
as one and the same. Thomas Franck identified four key indicators of legitimacy in his 1990 
work The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations that would contribute to an international 
institution or legal regime being believed to be legitimate: symbolic validation, determinacy, 
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coherence, and adherence.
26
 Franck did not distinguish between the law and the organization 
but the legitimacy of the two has become distinct as the relative power and autonomy of 
international organizations have increased in the mid-late 1990s. The capacity of institutions 
to generate their own internal law and use their own precedents to shape the interpretation of 
international law has to some extent redefined the substance of state obligations in 
international law.
27
 This means that while the original substance of a law may have broad 
legitimacy, it is possible that the specific institution interpreting this law lacks legitimacy. On 
the face of it, this has been the thrust of some of the AU’s criticism of the ICC, which 
acknowledged the importance of ending impunity and taking action against the perpetrators 
of international crimes, but questioned whether the ICC is the appropriate forum.
28
  Whilst 
this position has often been associated with a broader political rhetoric attacking international 
law, it provides an illustration of how the legitimacy of the law and the legitimacy of 
international institutions can be distinguished from one another.
29
   
The crime of aggression as a concept in international criminal law has a slightly different 
original legitimacy than that of the ICC. It can be split into two parts: the origin of the 
concept of individual criminal accountability and the enhancement of the international rule of 
the law. Individual criminal liability for aggression dates back to shortly before the drafting 
of the Treaty of Versailles, when the British and the French discussed the possibility of 
putting Kaiser Wilhelm II on trial for starting the First World War. Yet, it was only after the 
next world war, at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) in 1945, that this 
was actually put into practice against Nazi leaders, with the IMT Charter describing 
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aggression as the supreme crime since it ‘contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole’.30 This is based on the notion of projecting a form of public morality within the 
international order by locating and identifying individual enemies against the community.
31
  
The other source of the crime of aggression origins lies in Article 2 of the UN Charter, which 
is aimed at prohibiting armed intervention against another state in order to maintain the 
international rule of law. As William Schabas notes, this is also reflected in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights as well as in a number of other international instruments.
32
 The 
specific internationally prohibited practice, considered jus cogens, is interference in another 
state using illegal force, and while some scholars have argued that this is a narrow or 
contradictory principle, the general rule of non-use of force has become a central component 
of the international legal order.
33
 The General Assembly Resolution on Aggression follows 
this approach, describing aggression as ‘a crime against international peace’ which gives ‘rise 
to international responsibility’. However, the Resolution does not spell out criminal sanctions 
nor does it create a regime of enforcement for the crime.
34
 The main difference between this 
source and the criminalisation approach is that this focuses on strengthening existing 
institutions and the promotion of norm adherence, rather than on individual punishment for 
the act.  
2.4       Normative expectations upon the assumptions of the crime of aggression 
The ICC has acquired jurisdiction for a specific version of the crime of aggression defined by 
the Kampala Amendments. Nevertheless, in light of the above discussion on the original 
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legitimacy of both the ICC as an organization and the crime of aggression as a concept in 
international law, the activation of jurisdiction over aggression tends to create normative 
expectations for the ICC, which will then have an effect on the court’s original legitimacy. 
Three factors can explain this process.  
 
Firstly, the role of the ICC in enforcing the international rule of law, which falls under the 
second conception of the ICC’s original legitimacy detailed in 2.2 of this paper, will be 
enhanced by its authority to adjudicate on issues of aggression. The court is now being 
expected to rule on the causes of armed conflict, giving it an greater role in the promotion of 
the international rule of law, one which international criminal law has been reluctant to 
undertake since the 1950s because of the political complexities involved in such cases.
35
 As 
McCabe notes, the evolution of the crime of aggression post 1945 has focused on ‘political 
pariahs’, which are often relatively ‘soft’ cases, politically speaking.36 Although the fact that 
the jurisdictional regime under Article 15 bis of Amendments has the potential to exclude a 
large number of states was noticed in Kampala –as  Japanese delegate claimed, the 
jurisdictional regime adopted ‘unjustifiably solidifies blanket and automatic impunity of 
nationals of non-State Parties’ to the amendments on the crime of aggression,37 there is 
clearly expectation that the Amendments will improve the ICC’s existing role in enforcing 
the rule of law –Ban Ki Moon, the then UN Secretary General, declared in a press release at 
the time that the crime of aggression in the ICC would strengthen the ‘fight against 
impunity.’38 
                                                          
35
 Sergey Sayapin, The Crime of Aggression in International Criminal Law: Historical Development, 
Comparative Analysis and Present State (Springer, 2014). 
36
 A. McCabe, ‘Balancing “Aggression” and Compassion in International Law: The Crime of Aggression and 
Humanitarian Intervention’, 83 (2) Fordham Law Review (2014) pp.991 -992. 
37
 Patrycja Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression (Routledge, 2013) p.127. 
38
 UN News Centre ‘After years of debate, ICC Member States agree on definition of aggression’ 14 June 2010 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35018#.WBy3K9WLSig accessed 4 November 2016.  
Secondly, the ICC, having assumed the jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, has 
undertaken the specific function of cementing the norm prohibiting the use of force in 
international relations in its institutional framework. As Luban notes, one crucial function of 
international criminal tribunals is ‘their role in norm projection’.39 Therefore, through taking 
responsibility for the crime of aggression, the ICC is expressly assuming the duty to promote 
norm adherence in the realm of state’s use of force. Nevertheless, this may be problematic in 
practice since the prohibition on the use of force is a norm that is subject to a range of 
contradictory practices.
40
 For example, as John Strawson notes, the Indian invasion of Goa in 
1961 to enforce the right to self-determination was in a strict reading of the law, illegal, since 
the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples did 
not provide a regime for enforcement; yet, at the time, there were few doubts that the Indian 
government’s actions would be considered a legitimate use of force.41 Given the complex, 
and often contradictory interpretation of this norm, the court will have to make difficult 
political choices when deciding to initiate investigations into acts of aggression. In an 
Opinion Piece written shortly before the Kampala Conference, Richard Goldstone, the former 
prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, noted the risk 
that this would give ‘ammunition to critics who claim it is a politicized institution.’42 
Thirdly, with the existence of a crime comes the expectation of punishment for the 
perpetrators of that crime. As Schabas notes, if aggression is viewed ‘as the supreme crime’ 
then it becomes the channel whereby other international crimes find ‘their place’.43  
Acquiring jurisdiction for the crime of aggression can be seen either as an enhancement of 
the ICC’s existing legitimacy of origin or the creation of an alternate basis for this form of 
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legitimacy that is contingent on the court actually contributing to the process of peace-
making. The crucial element behind criminalization of conduct in International Criminal 
Law, as Kai Ambos puts it, is the existence of a ‘ius puniendi … the right or authority to 
punish’ in law.44  Thus, the entire process of criminalizing a practice presupposes punishment 
and the normative effects of punishment, such as deterrence. Indeed, there was a strong 
presumption during the process leading to the adoption of the Kampala Amendments that the 
ICC’s ability to prosecute individuals for illegal war-making would, as Claus Kress notes, 
‘increase the pressure on state leaders to refrain from aggression’.45 Clearly, such an authority 
can easily be considered an enhancement of the cosmopolitan justification for the ICC’s 
original legitimacy.  
The above considerations provide an outline of how the ICC’s original legitimacy would be 
affected by the activation of its jurisdiction on the crime of aggression. However, as the next 
section shows, these normative expectations are likely to be frustrated by the structure of the 
law itself, thus creating a functional legitimacy problem for the ICC.  
3.        The Crime of Aggression under Article 8 bis 
The definition of the crime of aggression under Article 8 bis of the Kampala Amendments 
imposes three basic requirements for an inter-state use of force to qualify as an offence under 
the Rome Statue. The first condition is that there is an act of aggression which Article 8 bis 
describes as ‘the use of force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State’.46 The second requirement is that there is the 
‘planning, preparation and initiation’ of the act of aggression by an individual who could 
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exercise control over state forces. This provides a definition of aggression with reference to 
actions and modes of participation instead of an indication as to the objectives of the crime, 
leaving open the prospect of prosecuting a head of government.
47
 During the drafting of the 
Kampala Amendments, states decided not to include considerations of purpose to establish 
the mental element of the crime; thus, for an act of aggression to be considered culpable 
under the Amendments, it must be committed with simple intent and knowledge.
48
 The third 
requirement, and probably the most limiting one, is that there must be a ‘manifest violation’ 
of the UN Charter, to be assessed by the act’s character, gravity and scale. This constitutes a 
threshold clause to the crime of aggression and as the handbook on the implementation of the 
Kampala Amendments makes clear, it is intended to confine prosecutions to ‘unambiguously 
illegal instances of the use of force.’49 
Overall, the definition of the crime adopted in Kampala imposes a high threshold of illegality 
which will exclude military interventions falling within the grey zone that permeates the law 
on resort to force. As the law on the use of force as applied to state practice is ambiguous and 
the absence of express legality does not necessarily mean absolute illegality, most cases of 
inter-state violence will not qualify as crimes of aggression. Applying the Kampala 
Amendments to instances of past interventions reveal that the adopted definition of the crime 
of aggression is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive and, as such, it will be difficult for 
the ICC to exercise its new jurisdiction in a coherent manner, hence leading to wider 
legitimacy problems for the court.  
3.1        Military Interventions Likely to Qualify as Crimes of Aggression 
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The UN Charter prohibits recourse to force by states and invests the Security Council with 
the sole authority to regulate collective policies concerning international security. Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter contains two core exceptions to the prohibition of force: Article 42 
allows the Security Council to take military action in order to ‘maintain or restore 
international peace and security’ and Article 51, preserves ‘the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense’ in the event of an armed attack.50 Therefore, military actions of a non-
defensive sort without UN authority cannot be legally justified and will be considered as acts 
of aggression under Article 8 bis of the Amendments to the Rome Statute.
51
  
An obvious example of a military action that would qualify as aggression is the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, which in spite of Iraqi protestations to the contrary, was 
condemned by the UN Security Council as an illegal use of force.
52
  The scale of the action, 
which involved the occupation of Kuwait, would almost certainly cross the manifest violation 
threshold envisaged by the Kampala Amendments. The US and UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
was not authorized by the UN Security Council and not justified on Article 51 grounds. 
Although the invading countries presented a ‘residual thesis’ according to which the violation 
of one Security Council Resolution could revive the authorization of the use of force in 
another Resolution, there are serious doubts as to whether this could provide any legal 
grounds for the operation.
53
 The Chilcot Report into the causes of the 2003 Iraq War, treats 
this with considerable scepticism, concluding that there were no grounds for believing in the 
existence of a residual right for states to unilaterally enforce UN Security Council 
Resolutions.
54
 Thus, in the event that an invasion like the 2003 invasion of Iraq occurs again, 
and the state in question is bound by the jurisdictional provisions under Article 15 bis, it is 
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likely that this would constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter and thus be 
considered a crime of aggression under the Kampala Amendments.
55
  
More controversial are the cases of forcible intervention with no express legality, but instead, 
a moral claim to authority is used as a substitute. The best example of illegal humanitarian 
intervention is the Kosovo War of 1999, when NATO acted to end the persecution of 
Kosovar Albanians by the government of former Yugoslavia.
56
 Since China and Russia 
resisted the idea of military intervention, NATO started an extensive bombing campaign 
against the former Yugoslavia without authorization of the Security Council.
57
 Yet, although 
in breach of the UN Charter provisions, NATO’s action is today considered as ‘illegal but 
legitimate’.58 Legitimacy in these cases stems from the moral priority of preventing a 
humanitarian catastrophe and the necessity of introducing flexibility in the application of the 
law in extreme circumstances.
59
 However, regardless of any claim of rightfulness, the 
definition of the crime of aggression as adopted in Kampala potentially includes instances of 
unlawful- but morally legitimate- uses of force.
60
 In these circumstances, the term ‘manifest 
violation’ and the whole of the threshold clause are unlikely to automatically exclude 
instances of illegal humanitarian interventions.
61
 It is doubtful that the qualifiers of 
‘character, gravity and scale’ would be sufficient to exclude actions such as NATO’s two-
month long bombing campaign. As the mens rea of the crime does not include bad faith, 
honourable motives would not negate intent or discount the will of the leader of a state to 
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engage in armed action.
62
 Thus, individuals in a leadership position who plan and conduct a 
Kosovo-style operation could be liable for the crime of aggression had they been aware of the 
conditions in which military action occurred, although, as the final section article 
demonstrates, there is every reason to believe that were prosecutions brought in these cases, 
they would be highly unlikely to succeed.  
3.2       Military Interventions that will Probably Not Qualify as Crimes of Aggression 
Interventions pursuant to Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter enjoy concrete legal cover and 
will not be considered acts of aggression. For example, the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII passed Resolution 1973 authorizing NATO forces to enforce a no-fly zone to 
ensure the protection of civilians in Libya.
63
 Other interventions, such as the US invasion in 
Afghanistan after 2001, were first and foremost legally justified as acts of self-defence. 
Broader readings of the right to self-defence might appear to vindicate invasions not 
compliant with conditions of proportionality and necessity imposed by law to this type of 
action.
64
 Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1978-1979 resulted in the toppling of Idi 
Amin’s government, raising questions as to whether or not Tanzania’s forces were acting 
within the bounds of the doctrine of self-defence when they pushed deep into Uganda in 
response to a relatively minor incursion into Tanzanian territory.
65
 Interventions of this sort 
would not be considered aggression, as military force of a defensive nature is to a large extent 
supported by international law and state practice. Thus, actions similar to that of Tanzania’s, 
although not indisputably legal, would not be considered completely illegal.  
In other instances, partial legal justifications may provide an alternate basis for intervention 
not explicitly mandated by the UN Charter. UN Resolutions that do not explicitly contain an 
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authorization to use force under Chapter VII would fall into this category. The no-fly zone 
established in Iraq in 1991 was set up under the authority of a Resolution which aimed to 
protect civilians and described the oppression against the Kurd population and other 
minorities as a ‘threat to international peace and security’, but did not explicitly authorize 
international action.
66
 Still, such military interventions do possess partial legal cover and as 
such, would not constitute a manifest violation of the Charter; likewise, they could not, by 
their character, gravity and scale, qualify as a crime of aggression under Article 8 bis. 
Enforcement actions undertaken by regional organizations are another type of intervention 
that would be unlikely to be considered acts of aggression. Although not unambiguously 
legal, interventions conducted by regional actors without obtaining a prior UN mandate have 
received ex post endorsement by the Security Council.
67
 The ECOWAS intervention in 
Liberia in 1990 was not conducted under Security Council authorization; nonetheless, the 
Council in Resolution 788, noting the provision of Chapter VIII, commended ECOWAS for 
its initiative to reinstate peace and stability in Liberia. Therefore, it is arguable that 
ECOWAS’ use of coercive force was retroactively ratified by the Security Council and given 
some legal standing ex post.
68
 Hence, this sort of action would also be unlikely to fall within 
the definition of the crime of aggression; although not completely legal, it would probably 
not constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter. 
The use of consent and self-defence based arguments to justify Western powers’ use of armed 
drones against groups situated in the territory of other states also tests limits of legality, albeit 
not to the point of rendering these attacks crimes of aggression. While states’ right of self-
defence, as traditionally understood, do not cover retaliations directed at non-state entities, 
the use of drone strikes as a response to terrorist threats amounts to pre-emptive self-defence, 
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a sort of action whose legality is far from settled in international law.
69
 Furthermore, when it 
comes to states consenting to allow other states to conduct drone strikes in their territory,
70
 
questions often arise as to the existence and validity of the agreement through which the host 
state approves another state’s drone strikes in its territory.71 The consent supposedly given by 
the governments of Pakistan and Yemen to US drone operations in their respective territories 
has been disputed by citizens and political groups within the two countries.
72
 As cooperation 
with US-led drone programmes raises internal political difficulties in the host country, often 
consent is not registered in public records.
73
 Hence, it is difficult to establish if the drones 
campaign in question complied with authority which was freely given by a responsible 
official of the country whose territory the terrorist group was located. Yet, despite these 
shortcomings, the legal case for drone strikes of the sort commonly used by Western powers 
in counterterrorism operations probably has sufficient backing so that it would not cross the 
manifest violation of the Charter threshold set out in the Amendments. Also in view of the 
‘character, gravity and scale’ of contemporary drone warfare would be unlikely to qualify as 
individual strikes are sufficiently localised that they would not constitute aggression.  
3.3       The Functional Legitimacy Issues Caused by the Narrowness of Article 8 bis.  
Article 8 bis is extremely narrow and many instances of the use of force will fall outside the 
ICC’s react for prosecution. The existing grey zones in the law on the use of force, in 
particular those surrounding the use of self-defence under Article 51, have led to a growth in 
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military actions that have a questionable legal basis, without being considered outright 
violations of the UN Charter.
74
 Equally, some military actions carried out by states which are 
notionally based on UN Resolutions are in fact relying on instruments that do not explicitly 
authorize the use of force and adopting a highly elastic approach to the rule-based 
conservatism of the law regulating the use of force.
75
 Again this is unlikely to be caught by 
the restrictive definition of Article 8 bis. The reason why the court is likely to err on the side 
of caution is that they would need to be mindful in the interpretation of this new crime not to 
potentially create unexpected or novel interpretations of criminal liability because, as James 
Boeving notes, ‘members of any type of legal system, be it local, national, or international, 
have a legitimate right to know in advance what conduct is prohibited.’76 Indeed, creating a 
far reaching or novel interpretation of Article 8 bis would amplify claims of prosecutorial 
overreach from some states. It is equally probable that other states would claim that by 
sticking to a narrow interpretation of the law, the ICC was privileging states engaging in 
aggression. As a result, this could create a functional crisis of legitimacy for the ICC, as the 
court would be implicitly taking sides with one bloc of states (whichever decision it 
ultimately took). In sum, were the court to take an expansive interpretation of its powers 
under Article 8 bis, there would be the risk that states would withdraw from the Rome Statute 
or that the court would become gridlocked with large numbers of referrals.
77
 On the other 
hand, were it to take the conservative interpretation of its powers under Article 8 bis, it is 
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possible that this decision would add to existing criticism that the ICC favours powerful 
states.
78
  
A legitimacy problem is then created because Article 8 bis does not lend itself easily to an 
application in relation to existing scenarios, which makes interpretations favouring existing 
power structures more likely. This is possible to cause similar functional legitimacy issues to 
the interpretation of Article 17. The doctrine of complementarity, under Article 17, applies 
when a state is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to carry out an investigation or prosecution, 
and allows the ICC to assert its jurisdiction over a particular situation, a process designed to 
protect the interests of justice rather than directly overrule the national legal system.
79
 
Complementarity was one of the legal factors contributing to the ICC’s focus on cases from 
African states in its first decade. This led to criticism that the provisions of the Rome Statute 
were drafted in a manner designed to cement Western superiority and non-Western 
victimhood, and Article 17 has been cited by opponents of the court as evidence of its anti-
African bias.
80
  
In the case of the Kampala Amendments, the lack of prosecutions resulting from the 
narrowness of the substantive definition of the crime is likely to be linked to the politics of its 
drafting. During the negotiations on the definition of the crime at the 2010 Kampala 
Conference, states were broadly split into two camps. States of the Non-Aligned group, who 
had a colonial past, and states that had been the victims of aggression favoured the adoption 
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of a more expansive version of the crime. States with stronger militaries or who had engaged 
in military action against other countries preferred a version of the crime with a narrow scope 
and weak jurisdictional powers.
81
 Many of the types of aggression falling outside the scope of 
Article 8 bis outlined in subsection 3.2 above, in particular drone strikes and the enforcement 
of no-fly zones, are often carried out by states that were in favour of narrowing the definition 
of the crime against aggression. This fits into a broader historical pattern observed by Nico 
Krisch, where dominant states influence the creation of international law and seek to shape 
laws concerning the use of force to maintain their own dominant position.
82
 This has the 
potential to exacerbate criticisms that the functional failures of the ICC are rooted in its 
institutional construction, a claim which could weaken the cosmopolitan basis of the ICC’s 
original legitimacy (outlined in section 2.3) by portraying the court as an organization that 
further entrenches existing sovereign inequality and impunity.  
4.        Prosecuting Cases of Humanitarian Intervention: The Functional Legitimacy 
problem in practice 
The first part of this article explained the distinction between original legitimacy and 
functional legitimacy of international organizations and the relationship between these two 
forms of authority in the context of the ICC. It has been argued that there exists a real 
potential for problems in the functional legitimacy of the organization to undermine its 
original legitimacy as a whole. As the section above pointed out, the structure of the Kampala 
Amendments excludes far more situations of aggression than they include. This may well 
lead to a frustration of the normative expectations raised by the activation of the crime of 
aggression, which in turn can endanger the institutional legitimacy of the court entirely. The 
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analysis thus far has focused on the substance of the law and what is eliminated from its 
scope but, as this section argues, there are strong reasons to believe that even if an act of 
aggression meets the requirements of Article 8 bis, it is highly unlikely that the ICC would be 
able to secure a conviction. Humanitarian intervention, which has received considerable 
attention from scholars and policy makers, provides a good case study to illustrate this 
problem, due to its contested status. Some of the points made below would apply to any 
prosecution of aggression, while some are specific to humanitarian intervention; in any case, 
they all serve to illustrate how Article 15 bis in tandem with procedural norms would cause a 
functional legitimacy crisis when prosecuting the crime of aggression. A chronological 
analysis of the procedural limitations and other legal factors surrounding the prosecution of 
the crime of aggression demonstrates that at every stage a prosecution of a humanitarian act 
of force is likely to fail, creating multiple and mutually distinct legitimacy problems for the 
ICC as an institution.  
4.1       Bespoke Jurisdiction: Exacerbating the Problem of Double Standards 
Article 15 bis allows state parties to the ICC to opt out from the jurisdiction of the crime of 
aggression, although non-state parties can still be referred by the Security Council for 
prosecution under Article 13 of the Rome Statute.
83
 It is noteworthy that nothing in the 
Amendments prevents a state party from strategically opting out of the jurisdiction for the 
crime of aggression prior to engaging in the use of force. McDougall argues that this is not 
possible, since the definition of the crime includes the preparation and planning of the act of 
aggression, in such circumstances the crime could have already been committed before a state 
opts out, which could arguably render its opt out invalid.
84
 Yet, this ignores the complex level 
of preparation that goes into some conflicts. It is conceivable that had the regime under the 
Kampala Amendments been in place at the time of the 2003 Iraq invasion, the UK 
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government would have opted out of Article 15 bis in September 2002 when the legal basis 
of an invasion was first contemplated, as a basic precautionary measure.
85
 This would then 
create some considerable debate as to what exactly ‘planning and preparation’ meant, an 
issue which could be very difficult for the pre-trial chamber to resolve.   
Since the legitimacy of the ICC depends in part on it being perceived as applying the 
principle of universal justice equally and impartially, the fact that Article 15 bis creates a 
jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression that allows large numbers of states to avoid 
prosecution poses a significant problem for the notion of equality before the law.
86
  At the 
time of writing in November 2016, only 12% state parties to the ICC are also state parties to 
Kampala Amendments, with a further 30% taking some kind of action to ratify the 
amendments. 
87
 States such as the United States, Russia and China are not party to the ICC 
and would be able to use the their power on the Security Council to protect themselves or 
other states from being prosecuted for aggression. This also creates an odd legal double 
standard whereby a state could effectively opt out of the legal consequences for the violation 
of a jus cogens norm.
88
 In Nicaragua v US, the ICJ was clear about the strict prohibition on 
the use of force under the UN Charter, and whilst Article 15 bis does not in theory weaken 
this rule, it does create a bifurcated regime for its enforcement.
89
 Moreover, the capacity of 
the ICC to make what Ian Hurd describes as future claims to authority would be reduced if, 
having assumed the capacity to rule on acts of aggression, the court remained inactive whilst 
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an act of aggression occurred; this may also affect state compliance, since the normative 
legitimacy of the court’s decision-making would be also undermined.90  
These problems apply generally to the operation of Article 15 bis but a Kosovo style 
intervention has an additional dimension. Considering the negotiation history of the 
Amendments, where states that had participated in humanitarian interventions argued for an 
explicitly exclusion of uses of force for humanitarian purposes from the definition of the 
crime of aggression, it would not be surprising if states such as the UK and France lodge an 
opt out declaration.
91
 This is not just because of their self-interest in conducting interventions, 
but also because these countries are among the more rule compliant states. Empirical research 
conducted by Emilia Powell identified a correlation between states with well-established 
national legal systems and states that tended to abide by obligations imposed by international 
courts.
92
 States that are current ICC signatories and fall into this category include Britain and 
France. For them the political cost of the opt out is lower than other alternatives, in particular 
if they were to argue that the regime under the Kampala Amendments was too onerous given 
their existing international commitments. Therefore, the inclusion of humanitarian 
intervention within the scope of Article 8 bis combined with the possibility of opting out 
from jurisdiction enshrined in Article 15 bis, weaken any anticipated deterrent effect of the 
crime of aggression, which in turn is likely to undermine the original legitimacy of the ICC.  
4.2        The Pre-trial Stage: The Potential of Rejection at the Admissibility Stage 
When the Prosecutor initiates an investigation, they are required under the Rome Statute to 
assess ‘the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims’.93 Their decision is then subject 
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to judicial review in pre-trial proceedings. In cases involving the crime of aggression, in both 
proprio motu cases and state referrals, if there has not been a determination by the Security 
Council that an act of aggression has been committed, the pre-trial division must authorize 
the commencement of investigations.
94
 This involves a panel of six judges assessing 
jurisdictional matters, the gravity of the crime and whether there are reasonable grounds to 
proceed.
95
 In order to confirm the charges, the judges must be satisfied that the prosecution 
has established substantial grounds to demonstrate the accused has committed the offence.
96
 
In cases of illegal humanitarian intervention, the Prosecutor may decide that it is not in the 
interests of justice to prosecute a state leader for the crime of aggression on a number of 
different grounds, such as the erga omnes protection of basic human rights.
97
 Equally, the 
pre-trial chamber may reject any such prosecution on legal grounds by arguing that, 
according to Understanding 6 of the Amendments, it is not clear that humanitarian 
intervention is an act of aggression.
98
 Understanding 6 states that a determination of an act of 
aggression involves consideration ‘of all the circumstances of each particular case, including 
… their consequences’.99 While the language adopted does not expressly refer to purposes, a 
flexible interpretation of the provision may find that the reference to consequences opens the 
way for considering the motives behind the operation.
100
 Still, as the Understandings were 
issued in Kampala to guide the ICC in the application of the crime, their legal status remains 
unclear.
101
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There are additional policy reasons for a case of humanitarian intervention to be dismissed at 
this stage. There have been concerns that the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute 
could lead to state inaction while mass atrocities unfold, as was the case in the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.
102
 Thus, the most likely way to deal with a case of humanitarian intervention under 
Article 8 bis is for the Prosecutor not to investigate the case at all.
103
 Yet, the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to investigate British war crimes in Iraq in 2006 received considerable criticism, 
even though there was evidence to suggest that in so doing the Prosecutor was focusing on 
the most serious situations, in line with their stated powers under the Rome Statute.
104
 
Furthermore, as scholars have pointed out, humanitarian intervention is often subject to a 
variety of complex political and social conditions, which make them less than clear-cut, and 
therefore at least warrant consideration as acts of aggression.
105
 As B.S. Chimni notes, it is 
not clear that the legitimacy of the norms being protected by humanitarian intervention 
justifies breaching the legal prohibition on the use of force.
106
 
 
Therefore, although it would be difficult for a Kosovo-style intervention to pass through the 
pre-trial stage, this would probably raise additional legitimacy problems. The notion that 
leaders who committed acts defined by the Amendments as crimes of aggression are 
exempted from prosecution, may certify the irrelevance of the court’s new authority to 
maintain international peace. This functional failure on the exercise of the ICC’s new 
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jurisdiction might backfire on the institution’s original legitimacy, now also based on its role 
to enforce the ban on the illegal initiation of wars. Dismissing a case of illegal humanitarian 
intervention at pre-trial stage would indicate not only ineffectiveness, but also double 
standards on the exercise of authority, possibly damaging the court’s perceived moral right to 
rule. Moreover, as Franck notes, the normative legitimacy of international law is dependent 
on a belief in ‘rule adherence between states’, and when this is challenged, alternate 
presumptions take root that the law does not work or that rule adherence is not in a state’s 
interests.
107
 Not investigating or dismissing an illegal humanitarian intervention in the 
manner described above would be a juridical endorsement of law-breaking; this would 
damage what Mattias Kumm terms the ‘formal legitimacy’ of the ICC, which is its authority 
as an international institution tasked with enforcing international law in order to prevent 
abuses of power and ‘inappropriate impositions by other states’.108  
Admittedly, these tensions would not be alleviated if the court decides to prosecute the case. 
Genuine humanitarian interventions are legitimated, in part, by the same universalist values 
that confer the court part of its legitimacy of origin. As such, it would be incoherent to indict 
a party for stopping an action that is per se criminalized in the Rome Statute. As noted in 
section two, a particular feature of the ICC is that the original legitimacy of the court also 
informs its functional legitimacy and hence prosecuting cases of illegal-but-legitimate uses of 
force could also have the effect of causing an institutional legitimacy crisis. This conundrum 
reflects the point that the crime of aggression has a distinct normative legitimacy from the 
one the ICC originally had, so when the protection of human rights conflicts with the 
promotion of order in international relations, the court cannot comply with the responsibility 
to defend both.  
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4.3        The Trial Stage: The Defence of Necessity 
If the case passes through the jurisdictional filters and reaches the trial stage, a leader who 
committed the alleged act of aggression would likely be acquitted via the application of a 
humanitarian defence based on the doctrine of necessity. Article 31 of the Rome Statute 
excludes criminal liability in cases where the act was in the defence of others or where there 
were circumstances of duress or necessity.
109
 Thomas Franck made a similar case, arguing 
that within the international order, penalties for illegal conduct may be mitigated on the basis 
of necessity.
110
 As Franck notes, in municipal law the doctrine of necessity accounts for cases 
where the law comes into conflict with justice and the need to defend shared legal interests 
can compel individuals to break the law under extreme circumstances.
111
 As an erga omnes 
obligation, the protection of fundamental human rights generates legal interests on the part of 
all states and as seen in the aftermath of the Kosovo War, the enforcement of international 
public interests may give rise to extra-legal justifications for illegal behaviour.
112
 Applying 
necessity to the crime of aggression would require the ICC judges to focus on the motives 
behind the action and its consequences, a latitude which Understanding 6 of the Amendments 
arguably allows.  
In an institutional context, as Leclerc-Gagne and Byers argue, a humanitarian defence of 
necessity would be consistent with ICC’s founding principles, since the Rome Statute was 
designed to avert the same human rights abuses as unauthorized humanitarian interventions 
are intended to end.
113
 Arguably the ICC, in a similar fashion to the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention, utilizes a conception of sovereignty that only considers sovereigns legitimate if 
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they protect the basic human rights of individuals living within their territory. If intervening 
without Security Council authorization prevented a large-scale humanitarian catastrophe, 
necessity would probably succeed as a complete exculpatory defence, making the defendant 
not criminally liable for the act of aggression.
114
 This conclusion finds support in Oscar 
Schachter’s statement that, in relation to humanitarian intervention, it would be better to 
‘acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary and desirable in the particular 
circumstances’ than it would be ‘to adopt a principle that would open a wide gap in the 
barrier against unilateral use of force.’115 The defence of necessity provides some resolution 
to the balancing conundrum outlined above – it allows the ICC to continue its stated 
cosmopolitan humanitarian aim whilst maintaining the prohibition against the use of force. 
Strictly speaking allowing a defence of necessity does not render the underlying crime moot; 
in municipal law murder is not considered decriminalised because the defence of necessity 
exists.  
However, the flip side to this reasoning can be seen by analysing what the defence requires 
judges to do – namely make an assessment that the harm caused by illegal intervention was 
less than the harm that would have resulted from inaction. This would require the court to 
take into account not only the civilian deaths but also the infrastructure damage caused by 
war in the victim state.
116
 This could undermine the bright-line prohibition on the use of force 
set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; but since the association agreement between the 
ICC and the UN defines the court as a separate permanent judicial institution with legal 
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personality, it is not clear to what extent this would affect the Security Council’s powers of 
decision making.
117
  
The necessity argument should also be treated with some suspicion even within the context of 
R2P. The UN Secretary General’s report on R2P was highly sceptical of the necessity 
argument in humanitarian intervention, stating that it ‘posed a false choice between two 
extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive 
military force to protect the vulnerable’.118 Moreover, as Saira Mohamed argues in the 
context of the Libya intervention, necessity in the sense of preventing human rights abuses is 
often couched in terms of state interest of the intervening state, rather than an absolute duty to 
protect individuals.
119
 Hence, the scope of the necessity defence would have to be wide 
enough to account for a range of political motivations. This points towards the central 
problem with the ICC accepting necessity as a defence - it involves making what amounts to 
an overtly political declaration that the court effectively endorses the reasoning of the state 
conducting the intervention. Considering that the international human rights regime as a 
whole is perceived by some states as a Trojan horse for the advancement of Western 
hegemony and both the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the ICC as an institution 
are common subjects of such criticism, the defence of necessity is likely to further exacerbate 
the legitimacy problems faced by the ICC.
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5.      Conclusion  
Immi Tallgren described international criminal law as building a ‘fortress of its own, with its 
own laws and policies’, and in many respects, the Kampala Amendments follow this general 
trend.
121
 Whilst offering a broadly coherent system of rules governing the substance of the 
criminal conduct of starting unlawful wars, the law to be adopted excludes many more 
potential instances of aggression than it includes. Moreover, the jurisdictional regime of the 
Kampala Amendments aggravates complicated double standards in the operation of the ICC 
by providing the opt-out option for the crime of aggression. These issues need to be seen in 
the general context of the ICC as an institution, which as Triestino Mariniello argues, has 
already ‘unrealistic expectations’ being placed upon it, in particular, the assumption that ‘as a 
new civilizing institution’ it provides a definitive ‘cure for radical evil.’122 As argued above, 
the functional legitimacy of the ICC is almost certainly going to be undermined when acts of 
aggression take place but the court is unable to act due to the structure of the law to be 
incorporated into the Rome Statute. The ICC’s jurisdiction for the crime of aggression would 
rarely be, if ever, utilised, leaving the authority to punish perpetrators of the crime of 
aggression as a mostly exhortatory power. In addition, as the case study of humanitarian 
intervention suggests, even when a case does meet the requirements in Article 8 bis and 
Article 15 bis, it is still possible that a conviction would not occur. Such an outcome would 
have the effect of signalling that the types of violations committed by states that are 
otherwise norm abiding (state parties to the ICC and the Amendments) but that at the same 
time are powerful (can conduct humanitarian intervention) are exculpated, feeding into the 
criticisms that some ICC state parties are effectively immune from accountability.  
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The problem lies in the structure of the law itself, rather than in the capacity of the ICC as an 
institution.  The delay in drafting a definition of the crime of aggression was an attempt by 
states to reach a compromise which could have the maximum buy-in from state parties. 
However, the desire for inclusivity has led to a weak set of laws that are more the product of 
state self-interest than a codification of existing legal principles and international consensus 
on the subject of aggression. The Amendments will also come into force in the least 
opportune moment in the organization’s history, when a number of countries are actively 
planning to leave the court. The activation of the jurisdiction on aggression presents the ICC 
with the burden of acquiring a new authority that carries specific normative expectations 
which the court will be unable to fulfil; as a result, a fresh crisis of functional legitimacy for 
the court seems inevitable.  
 
 
